Field report 4 · AI governance
Provable, not claimed: a tamper-evident log for AI agents
How to prove after the fact what an autonomous AI agent did, without anyone being able to change the log unnoticed.
- Status
- In trial Design in trial, not yet in production.
- Published
- Publisher
- SIMO GmbH, Aschaffenburg, Germany
Starting questionHow can we prove after the fact what an autonomous AI agent did, in a way that nobody can change the log unnoticed?
What we trialled
Every relevant event is stored as a link in a chain, with a reference to its predecessor and a signature. Such events include a tool call, a policy decision or a key rotation.
The signing key is bound to the hardware. If the chain is altered, that shows, and the device is isolated.
What it means for business architecture
Autonomy needs audit-proof records. Only a complete trail makes AI agents acceptable to auditors, internal audit and supervisors.
Learnings
- An encrypted connection protects the transport, not the stored log.
- Security depends on the hardware. Weaker devices mean weaker guarantees, and that has to be said openly.
- The format of log entries has to be frozen early. Every later change breaks compatibility.
- audit trail
- AI agents
- audit-proof records
- signature